THE FCC's TELEVISION DUOPOLY RULE:

IS THE THIRD TIME THE CHARM?"
William R. Richardson, Jr.t

I. INTRODUCTION
Almost since its inception, the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC" or "Commission") has employed its broad authority under the public interest standard of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended,' to
impose limits on the ownership of broadcast stations.2 Always controversial, Commission broadcast ownership policies have come under Supreme
Court review on three occasions 3 and led to congressional intervention on
many others.4
The debate about whether and to what extent the public interest requires
or permits these limits in today's video marketplace has now resurfaced. In
* Cf. Covad Communications Co. v. FCC, 450 F.3d 528, 531 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (upholding FCC unbundling rules under 47 U.S.C. § 251, and concluding that "the Commission's
fourth try is a charm").
1 J.D., 1976, University of Virginia School of Law; A.B., 1973, Princeton University.
Mr. Richardson is a partner with the law firm of Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr
LLP, whose clients include television stations with an interest in the proceedings described
herein.
1 Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 307, 309 (2000).
2
See, e.g., In re Genesee Radio Corp., Flint, Mich. Application For Construction Permit, Statement of Facts, Grounds for Decision, and Order, 5 F.C.C. 183, 186-87 (Mar. 2,
1938). See generally Herbert H. Howard, Multiple Broadcast Ownership: Regulatory History, 27 FED. CoMM. B.J. 1, 3-4 (1974).
See Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (limiting network ownership of stations in the same area); United States v. Storer Broad. Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956)
(limiting to seven the number of AM, FM, and television stations that could be owned nationwide); FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775 (1978) (noting the prohibition on newspaper-broadcast cross-ownership).
4
See, e.g., Second Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 98-396, § 304, 98
Stat. 1369, 1423 (1984); Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108-199, 118 Stat.
3, 99 (2004); Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202, 110 Stat. 56,
110-12.
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July 2006, the Commission released an order, as required under the biennial (now quadrennial) review process established by Congress in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996 Act"),5 launching its third such review of the limits on broadcast ownership.6 This debate promises to be no
less controversial than it was the last time around, when Commissioner
Copps exclaimed:
Don't tell me that those of us who feel strongly about this are being too emotional ....
As for the emotion, I have seen the concern, the deep feeling and outright alarm on the
faces of people who have come out to talk to Commissioner Adelstein and me all
across this broad land. Are they7 emotional? You bet. And I think they are going to stay
that way until we get this right.

However the Commission resolves this review process, running the judicial gauntlet thereafter will not be easy. Following the Commission's initial 1998 Review, the D.C. Circuit rejected the basis for two of the Commission's rules and went so far as to direct the Commission to repeal a
third, based on challenges that they were insufficiently deregulatory.8 Following the Commission's 2002 Review, the Third Circuit invalidated the
underlying basis for much of the Commission's decision,9 this time in light
of concerns that a different Commission had been too deregulatory.' ° In5 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(h), 110 Stat. 56, 110-

11.

6

In re 2006 Quadrennial Regulatory Review-Review of the Commission's Broadcast

Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996; 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of the Commission's Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996; Cross Ownership of Broadcast Stations and Newspapers; Rules
and Policies Concerning Multiple Ownership of Radio Broadcast Stations in Local Markets;
Definition of Radio Markets, Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 21 F.C.C.R. 8834
(June 21, 2006) [hereinafter 2006 Notice]. The Commission's first review began in 1998.
See In re Review of the Commission's Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting;
Television Satellite Stations Review of Policy and Rules, Report and Order, 14 F.C.C.R.
12903 (Aug. 5, 1999) [hereinafter 1998 Review]. The Commission's second review began
in 2002. In re 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of the Commission's Broadcast
Ownerships Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996; Cross-Ownership of Broadcast Stations and Newspapers; Rules and
Policies Concerning Multiple Ownership of Radio Broadcast Stations in Local Markets;
Definition of Radio Markets; Definition of Radio Markets for Areas Not Located in an
Arbitron Survey Area, Report and Orderand Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R.
13,620 (June 2, 2003) [hereinafter 2002 Review], affid in part and remanded in part, Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372 (3d. Cir. 2004), certs. denied, 125 S.Ct.
2902-04 (2005).
7 2002 Review, supra note 6, at 13,955 (Copps, Comm'r, dissenting).
8 Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (Fox 1), modified on reh'g, 293 F.3d 537 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (Fox If); Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc. v.
FCC, 284 F.3d 148 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
9 Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2004), certs. denied, 125 S.
Ct. 2902-04 (2005).
10 Id. In the view of the Commission minority, the agency had "empower[ed] America's
new Media Elite with unacceptable levels of influence over the media on which our society
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deed, that court took the extraordinary step of preserving its stay of the
Commission's decision indefinitely, "pending our review of the Commission's action on remand, over which this panel retains jurisdiction." 1 ' In
doing so, the Third Circuit has imposed a substantial further stay of any
changes to the very rules that Congress requires the Commission to revisit.,,
In its 2006 Review, the Commission will reassess a number of different
broadcast ownership rules, 13 some of which seem destined for substantial
relaxation. In the 2002 Review, the Commission recognized the need for
significant relief from its limits on cross-ownership of newspaper, radio,
and television stations, and the Third Circuit did not appear unreceptive to
such relief if structured consistently and articulated rationally. 14 While
some speculate that these cross-ownership limits are now less of a priority
for large media firms, which are concentrating much of their attention on
and our democracy so heavily depend." 2002 Review, supra note 6, at 13,951 (Copps,
Comm'r, dissenting).
11 Prometheus, 373 F.3d at 435. The Third Circuit's directive raises the interesting
question of whether challenges to the 2006 review will be transferred to it under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2112(a)(5). Ordinarily, transfer is appropriate following remand of "the same or [an]
interrelated proceeding," where necessary "to maintain continuity." See, e.g., Eschelon
Telecom, Inc. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 682, 682 (8th Cir. 2003) (order granting request for transfer) (quoting Public Serv. Comm'n for New York v. FPC, 472 F.2d 1270, 1272 (D.C. Cir.
1992)). Here, however, the 2006 review will address not only the Third Circuit's remand,
but also a statutory mandate for a quadrennial review proceeding in light of the current state
of competition, independent of the remand order. It was for that reason that the Third Circuit itself rejected the argument for continuity and consistency, made by the FCC and other
parties seeking a transfer to the D.C. Circuit based on that court's 2002 remand of the previous review of the same rule. Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, No. 03-3388, at 4 (3d Cir.
Sept. 15, 2003) (order denying transfer motion). The panel majority rejected Chief Judge
Scirica's reliance in dissent on "the fundamental jurisprudential underpinning that agency
decisions on remand should be reviewed by the remanding court." Id. at 7.
12 The extension of this stay was not accompanied by any of the usual findings required
for equitable relief. Such relief seems in tension with the statutory requirement of periodic
review of these rules in section 202(h) of the 1996 Act, and the established principle that
"the function of the reviewing court ends when an error of law is laid bare." See FCC v.
Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 792 n.15 (1978) (quoting FPC v. Idaho
Power Co., 344 U.S. 17, 20 (1952)); see also FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134
(1940) (dissolving writ of mandamus issued following FCC's decision to implement different result following remand); NLRB v. Food Store Employees Union, Local 347, 417 U.S.
1, 9-10 (1974); Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 817-26
(1973).
13 The Commission has solicited comment on the local television and radio ownership
rules, the limits on newspaper/broadcast and radio/television cross-ownership, and the dual
network rule. 2006 Notice, supra note 6,
11-33. The quadrennial review no longer includes the national television ownership limits, but the Commission has asked whether the
new proceeding may and should reconsider the UHF discount used in calculating compliance with those national limits. Id. 1 34-35. See also Prometheus, 373 F.3d at 396-97 (3d
Cir. 2004), certs. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2902-04 (2005).
14 Prometheus, 373 F.3d at 402-03.
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Internet-based strategies for delivering video programming, 5 the television
duopoly rule remains an open question. That rule, which is the focus of this
analysis, generally bars common ownership of any two of the top four
rated television stations in a single market, or any two stations in markets6
with fewer than eight independently-owned full power television stations.'
Incumbent television broadcasters in smaller markets will be particularly
concerned over whether the Commission will be able to provide them
meaningful relief from the television duopoly rule in its 2006 Review, especially in light of these prior court decisions. 7
A lot will be riding on the answer to this question. Whatever the financial health of the "giants that own the TV networks and the cable systems,' 8 the future faced by owners of television stations in smaller markets is quite different. 9 These smaller-market firms are challenged by increased competition for advertising revenues from cable, direct broadcast
satellite operators, and other emerging multichannel providers. 20 They face
changing advertising demands based upon widespread Internet penetration. 2' Their traditional compensation payments from ABC, CBS, Fox, and
NBC have been reversed, and they are losing their traditional exclusive
local distribution rights for popular network programming.22 Finally, they
are incurring substantial expenses associated with the 2009 Digital Television ("DTV") transition,23 without thus far being able to deploy DTV
15 See Frank Ahrens, As FCC Digs Into Ownership, Big Media No Longer Cares,
WASH. POST, June 29, 2006, at Dl. But see In re Applications for Consent to the Assign-

ment and/or Transfer of Control of Licenses; Adelphia Communications Corporation, (and
subsidiaries, debtors-in-possession), Assignors, to Time Warner Cable Inc. (subsidiaries),
Assignees; Adelphia Communications Corporation, (and subsidiaries, debtors-inpossession), Assignors and Transferors, to Comcast Corporation (subsidiaries), Assignees
and Transferees; Comcast Corporation, Transferor, to Time Warner Inc., Transferee; Time
Warner Inc., Transferor, to Comcast Corporation, Transferee, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 8203, 8366 (July 13, 2006) (Copps, Comm'r, dissenting) ("Believe me,
this party is far from over.").
16 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(b) (2002) (codification of the duopoly rule).
17 See Letter from David K. Rehr, President & CEO, Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters, to the
Honorable Kevin J. Martin, Chairman, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n (Feb. 8, 2006) [hereinafter
Rehr Letter], available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prodlecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-orpdf
=pdf&iddocument=6518324593.
18 2002 Review, supra note 6, at 13,953 (Copps, Comm'r, dissenting). See also id., at
13,981 & n.17 (citing 70% prime time share collectively held by five media conglomerates:
Viacom, Disney, AOL Time Warner, NewsCorp, and NBC/GE); id. at 13,982 (Adelstein,
Comm'r, dissenting) ("It is not the Commission's job to make sure every big television
network makes money....").
19 See Rehr Letter, supra note 17 (citing "unprecedented financial pressures" on smaller
market television broadcasters).
20 id.
21 Id.
22 Id.

23 Id. (noting loss of network compensation along with DTV transition as substantial
expenses).
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channel capacity to create new revenues of the kind that provide their
largely unregulated cable competitors with what the
Commission has rec' 24
ognized to be a significant "competitive advantage.
In the face of these industry trends, even the Commission minority that
strongly opposed other deregulatory aspects of the 2002 review did not
seem to dispute the majority's conclusion that broadcasters' ability "to
compete successfully in the delivered video market is meaningfully and
negatively affected in mid-sized and smaller markets. 25 Moreover, in past
reviews, opponents of duopoly relief have focused their attention on the
prospects of "triopolies '' 26 and on other ownership rules, such as the newspaper cross-ownership ban and the national ownership cap. With respect to
the duopoly rule, Commissioner Adelstein recognized in dissent that
"common ownership may be appropriate . . . in the smallest of markets
where proven localism gains may outweigh the diversity harms. 27
Still, there is no doubt that, at least for mid-sized markets, there remains
substantial opposition to further relaxation of the duopoly rule. This opposition stems from views about the "special role" that local television stations are perceived to play in our society, as "the primary source of news
and information. 28 It also reflects fears about the irreversibility of consolidation and "homogenized" programming based on the "Clear Channelization" of radio after the 1996 Act. 29 In Commissioner Copps' view, that
experience "should terrify us as we consider visiting upon television and
newspapers what we have inflicted upon radio."3 Ultimately, the dispute
here may also reflect what has been identified as "the tension between satisfying and shaping media experiences. 31
These competing views pose a real challenge for the Commission's 2006
Review of the television duopoly rule, particularly in light of the close
judicial scrutiny of the Commission's prior efforts and the inevitability of
further appeals this time around. This article highlights five key topics that
the Commission will inevitably face in this exercise, as to which it has not
always taken a consistent view. The Commission must first decide what,
24
25

2002 Review, supra note 6, 62.
Id. at 201. See also 2002 Review, supra note 6, at 13,953 (Copps, Comm'r, dissent-

ing); id. at 13,982 (Adelstein, Comm'r, dissenting).
26 See 2002 Review, supra note 6,
186 (permitting common ownership of three stations in markets with at least 18 stations).
27

Id. at 13,998.

28

1998 Review, supra note 6,

18 & n.34,

58,

68 & n. 119. Such views about "the

most influential of all communications media" are deep-seated. See In re Amendment of
Section 73.636(a) of the Commission's Rules relating to Multiple Ownership of Television
Broadcast Stations, 5 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1609, 6 (June 21, 1965) (proposing a "top
fifty" policy).
29 2002 Review, supra note 6, at 13,952, 13,988 (Copps, Comm'r, dissenting).
30 Id. at 13,952.
31 Ellen Goodman, Media Policy Out of the Box: Content Abundance, Attention Scar-

city, and the Failuresof DigitalMarkets, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1389, 1395 (2004).
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exactly, Section 202(h) means in the face of uncertainty about the future
effects of duopoly relief. It must then articulate more clearly its vision of
an economic market for "delivered video programming," and explain how
that market differs from the "marketplace of ideas." Its updated competition and diversity analyses must avoid the internal inconsistencies of its
past efforts, and its diversity analysis must address the dangers of relying
on the popularity of broadcast voices as a justification for legal restrictions
on them. Finally, the Commission must pay closer attention to the record in
assessing the need for a ban on top four station duopolies in the smaller
markets.
Since both the D.C. Circuit and the Third Circuit have made clear that
they will pay close attention to how the Commission's position does or
does not conform to its earlier views on these questions, it is important to
address each of them in light of the analytical framework relied upon by
the Commission in its 1998 and 2002 Reviews.
I. THE COMMISSION'S 2006 REVIEW OF THE TELEVISION
DUOPOLY RULE

A. Presumptive Deregulation: What Exactly Does Section 202(h) Mean in
the Face of Uncertainty About the Future?
In Fox Television Stations and Sinclair Broadcasting Group, 32 the D.C.
Circuit essentially concluded that the Commission had posed the wrong
question in its 1998 Review. Instead of asking whether there existed any
persuasive basis to keep the rules at issue, the agency had adopted a "waitand-see approach" in order to gather data as to whether there was a persuasive basis for revising or eliminating them. 33 Due to the absence of certainty as to what the effects of greater media consolidation might be on
competition and diversity, the court's shifting of this burden of persuasion
is an important one.34 As with the prior reviews, a threshold question in
32

Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027 (Fox 1), modified on reh'g, 293

F.3d 537 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (Fox I); Sinclair Broad. Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148 (D.C.
Cir. 2002).
33 FoxL 280 F.3d at 1042, 1044, 1048; Sinclair,284 F.3d at 164.
34 For example, while the study commissioned by the FCC for the later 2002 review
"provide[d] evidence of substitution by consumers" among different media, it concluded
that it "cannot completely answer the question" about intermedia substitution for news and
information. Joel Waldfogel, Consumer Substitution Among Media 3 (Fed. Commc'ns
Comm'n, Media Ownership Working Group, 2002). Similarly, the correlation between
ownership and viewpoint is one whose degree, the Commission found, "cannot be established with any certitude." 2002 Review, supra note 6, 1 364.
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any anticipated court challenge to the Commission's 2006 Review will be
how section 202(h) of the 1996 Act affects the allocation of this burden in
the face of such uncertainty.35 And here, that question is complicated by
the different perspectives of the D.C. and Third Circuits.
The D.C. Circuit's colorful metaphor for section 202(h)-that it is akin
to Admiral Farragut's directive to "Damn the torpedoes! Full speed
ahead" 36-is obvious hyperbole. That section directs the Commission to
repeal-or modify-an ownership rule only if it is able to determine that
the rule is no longer in the public interest. 7 The Third Circuit has upheld,38
and it is likely that the D.C. Circuit would now find reasonable, 39 a FCC
determination that the Commission may keep an ownership rule if it is
merely useful, rather than indispensable, to the agency's discharge of its
public interest mandate.' °
But how much discretion the Commission continues to have under section 202(h) in determining that a rule meets this "useful" test is less clear.
Could the Commission make such a determination on a theory that eliminating or relaxing it may have adverse effects that the Commission is still
unable to predict with any degree of certainty? Of course, the Commission
cannot obtain a free pass from its section 202(h) obligation by "simply
cry[ing] 'diversity!" '' 4' Nor can it do so because, unlike Admiral Farragut,
the Commission wants to "observe the effects" of taking a more modest
deregulatory speed.42 Indeed, the D.C. Circuit went further in Sinclair and
specifically rejected the decision not to deregulate based upon the existence of "unresolved questions" about intermedia substitutability.43 That
35 Quite apart from section 202(h), in a case involving cable multiple ownership limits
(to which that section does not apply), the D.C. Circuit appeared to view such limits
through the lens of the First Amendment, justifying unusually probing standards of judicial
review. Time Warner Entm't Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2001). In analyzing the
1998 review of the duopoly rule, however, the court rejected similar arguments for more
than rational basis review of that rule as incompatible with prior Supreme Court decisions
governing broadcast regulation. Sinclair, 284 F.3d at 167-69. This distinction underscores
the oddity of continuing to view broadcasting as a First Amendment stepchild, in an era
when viewing of cable and DBS programming has now surpassed that of local broadcast
stations.
36 Fox!, 280 F.3d at 1044.
37 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(h), 110 Stat. 56.
38 Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 390-95 (3d Cir. 2004), certs. denied, 125 S.Ct. 2902-04 (2005).
39 Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC (Fox I1), 293 F.3d 537, 540 (D.C. Cir. 2002);
Cellco P'ship v. FCC, 357 F.3d 88 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (deferring to FCC interpretation of
virtually identical language in 47 U.S.C. § 161, the regulatory reform provision of which
the section 202(h) reviews are expressly made a "part"); Prometheus, 373 F.3d at 393-95
(analyzing Cellco).
40 Prometheus, 373 F.3d at 391-92.
41 Sinclair,284 F.3d at 170 (Sentelle, J., dissenting in part).
42 Fox 1, 280 F.3d at 1042.
43 Sinclair,284 F.3d at 164-65.
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court did not view this rationale as any more acceptable than the "wait and
see approach" it rejected in Fox.'
The Third Circuit has not squarely addressed how the Commission
should deal with the problem of uncertainty, or whether a Commission
"determin[ation]" that a rule continues to serve "the public interest" under
the language of section 202(h)45 could be justified where there is uncertainty about the effects of further deregulation. That court has suggested,
however, that all section 202(h) does is extend the same requirement of
reasoned analysis, applicable to a decision to issue a new rule, to "the
Commission's decision to retain [an] existing [one]. 46
This view seems premised on the erroneous position that, prior to the enactment of section 202(h), the agency had no such obligation "periodically
to justify its existing regulations. '47 As other courts have recognized in
dealing with FCC ownership restrictions, "where the factual assumptions
which support an agency rule are no longer valid, agencies ordinarily must
reexamine their approach. 4 8 Thus, whether it has merely a "deregulatory
tenor" or rises to the level of a "deregulatory presumption, '49 section
202(h) must have been intended to mean something more than what existing administrative law principles already required.50 And at some point,
particularly in light of the extensive opportunity the Commission has had
to assess the effects of local marketing agreements ("LMAs") on local
television markets, 51 it becomes more difficult to justify continued regulation on the basis of uncertainties that the Commission has not taken the
initiative to resolve. Indeed, in its 2002 Review, the Commission already
seemed to conclude that LMAs had not "facilitat[ed] the exercise of market
44 Id.
45 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(h), 110
Stat. 56 ("The
Commission... shall determine whether any [ownership rules] are necessary in the public
interest as the result of competition. The Commission shall repeal or modify any regulation
it determines to be no longer in the public interest.").
46 Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 390-95 (3d Cir.
2004), certs denied, 125 S.Ct. 2902-04 (2005).
47 id.
48 Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 69 F.3d 752, 767 (6th Cir.
1995) (citing Bechtel v.
FCC, 957 F.2d 873, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 816 (1992)). See also
Geller v. FCC, 610 F.2d 973, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1979); accord., In re 1998 Biennial Regulatory
Review-Review of the Commission's Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules
Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Notice of Inquiry, 13 F.C.C.R. 11,276, 11,302 (Mar. 12, 1998) [hereinafter 1998 NO]] (separate statement of Comm'r Furchtgott-Roth).
49 Prometheus, 373 F.3d at 445 (Scirica, C.J., dissenting).
50 The cardinal principle of statutory construction that presumes that Congress does not
legislate superfluously has particular force with respect to the regulatory review provisions
of the 1996 Act, the overriding purpose of which was "to provide for a pro-competitive, deregulatory national policy ..." H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 113 (1996).
S1 See Sinclair Broad. Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (describing
the Commission's approach to LMAs).
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power" against advertisers, and had actually increased the likelihood of
local news coverage. 52
In any event, a Commission decision not to 'wait and see' in the face of
such uncertainties should be able to withstand judicial scrutiny, assuming
that it is based upon an adequate record and carefully and consistently explained. 3 The Supreme Court, in the leading case involving the scope of
judicial review of deregulation, has held: "[A]n agency may ...

revoke a

standard on the basis of serious uncertainties if supported by the record and
reasonably explained."54 In other words, repeal or relaxation of a rule need
not require an affirmative demonstration that the status quo is wrong; it can
simply be based on55 a showing that "there is no cause to believe that the
status quo is right.,
Although reversing the Commission's 2002 Review, the Third Circuit itself acknowledged this point. 56 It upheld the Commission's rejection of a
blanket ban on newspaper-broadcast combinations, on the basis that "the
Commission reasonably concluded that it did not have enough confidence
in the proposition that commonly owned outlets have a uniform bias" to
warrant sustaining that ban.57 Thus, in its 2006 Review, the Commission
similarly should be free to resolve legitimate uncertainties about the need
for the duopoly rule as presently drafted in favor of modifying it, however
section 202(h) is interpreted.
B. The Marketplace of Ideas Versus the Market for "Delivered Video
Programming"
For many years the Commission identified two justifications for its
broadcast multiple ownership rules: a desire to maximize diversification of
program and service viewpoints, and a concern about "undue concentration

52

2002 Review, supra note 6,

159.

53 Prometheus, 373 F.3d at 389-90 (court will defer to an agency's decisions so long as

the agency provides a reasonable explanation for its action).
54 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 51-52
(1983). The Court so held even after rejecting MVMA's argument that the Administrative
Procedure Act embodied a presumption in favor of deregulation. However, just as continued regulation cannot be premised on the existence of uncertainties that the agency takes no
reasonable efforts to resolve, the Court cautioned that the agency must supply a justification
for eliminating a rule without first "engaging in a search for further evidence." Id. at 52. As
noted above, the Commission has undertaken to include further studies in its 2006 review
that will continue that search.
55 Ctr. for Sci. in the Pub. Interest v. Dep't of the Treasury, 797 F.2d 995, 999 (D.C.
Cir. 1986).
56 Prometheus,373 F.3d at 399-400.
57

Id.

COMMLAW CONSPECTUS

[Vol. 15

of economic power." 8 In the 2002 Review, the Commission decided to
grant only limited relief from the duopoly rule because of competition, not
diversity, concerns.59
The debate about "how much diversity is enough" will undoubtedly continue in the 2006 Review of this rule, given updated data reflecting more
recent marketplace developments.' Yet the Commission addressed that
question definitively in the 2002 Review of the duopoly rule.61 While it
declined to equate the benefits of greater program diversity from a duopoly
combination with what it viewed as greater opportunities for viewpoint
diversity from separate ownership, the Commission acknowledged that
duopolies have led to greater investment in news and other informational
programming of the kind that forms the touchstone of its diversity analysis. 62 The Commission also relied heavily on other media outlets in supplying viewpoint diversity. It noted that there are "countless other sources of
news and information available to the public," 63 that "data strongly suggest
58

In re Amendment of Sections 3.35, 3.240 and 3.636 of the Rules and Regulations

Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, Report and
Order, 18 F.C.C. 288, 291-92 (Nov. 25, 1953). Accord, FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for
Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 780 (1978); 1998 Review, supra note 6, 1 15 ("'twin goals' of competition and diversity"). The Commission has more recently added concerns about "localism"
to the mix. See 2002 Review, supra note 6,
73-79. By "localism," the Commission refers
not to local ownership (an earlier FCC policy) but to what are at least arguably program
content judgments: "the selection of programming responsive to local needs and interests,
and local news quantity and quality." Id. 78. While this addition appears to have reflected
concerns that media consolidation would diminish the quantity or quality of local programming, the 2002 review found essentially the opposite to be the case. Id. in 157-69. Ownership regulation is a clumsy way to address such concerns, and the Commission has a separate proceeding designed to address them, through "behavioral rules that promote localism,
regardless of identity of ownership." In re Broadcast Localism, Notice of Inquiry, 19
F.C.C.R. 12,425, 5 (June 7, 2004) [hereinafter BroadcastLocalism NOI]. The Democratic
minority have sought to resolve that proceeding as a condition to any changes to the ownership rules. 2006 Notice, supra note 6, at 2 (Adelstein, Comm'r, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
59 2002 Review, supra note 6,
620-21.
60 Those developments have suggested to one observer that the problem today is not a
lack of sufficient viewpoints, but limits on viewers' capacity to absorb them all, together
with new tools allowing viewers to screen them out. Goodman, supra note 31, at 1395.
61 The Third Circuit cautioned that "the degree to which the Commission can rely on
cable or the Internet" for viewpoint diversity "is limited," based on the prior record. Prometheus, 373 F.3d at 415. See discussion infra Part II.D.
62 2002 Review, supra note 6,
157-69. These issues about the relative advantages and
disadvantages of group ownership are not new. See Howard, supra note 2, at 35-39 (summarizing testimony at FCC's 1958 network study hearings), 47-56 (consideration of proposed top 50 policy), 59-60 (NAB study opposing one-to-a-market proposal). See also In re
Amendment of Sections 73.34, 73.240, and 73.636 of the Commission's Rules Relating to
Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and Television Stations, Second Report and Order,
50 F.C.C.2d 1046, 1063-65 (Jan. 28, 1975) (subsequent history omitted) (discussing the
benefits of newspaper cross-ownership).
63 2002 Review, supra note 6,
178.
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that media can be viable substitutes for one another for the dissemination
of news, information and viewpoint expression," ' and that "the majority of
markets have an abundance of viewpoint diversity. 65
A much more interesting feature of the 2002 Review of the duopoly rule
was its new wrinkle on the traditional competition analysis. The Commission concluded that "some limitations on local television ownership are
necessary to promote competition, 66 even though unnecessary for diversity reasons. 67 Traditionally, the Commission's competition analysis had
centered on only two economic markets, both of which involve products
that television stations actually sell (advertising) or buy (programming).6 8
In the 2002 Review, the Commission decided essentially to ignore these
traditional markets and to focus almost entirely on a third ostensible economic market for delivered video programming ("DVP"), something that
local broadcast stations neither sell nor buy.6 9
In the Commission's view, the participants in the DVP market-which it
also referred to as the market for "watching television ' '7° -included fewer
and less robust competitors than those in the broader marketplace of ideas
that formed the basis of its diversity analysis. 7' Because the Commission's
analytical distinction between these two was essential to its decision in
retaining the duopoly rule largely unaltered as it applies to smaller markets,72 it warrants a careful reexamination in the 2006 Review. Perhaps the
distinction was designed to finesse the more elusive question about how to
measure viewpoint diversity,73 allowing the Commission to point out that it
was maintaining stricter limits for competitive reasons and thereby mooting diversity issues.74 As noted below, however, it can be argued that this
analysis failed to identify either the real participants in the relevant economic market, those who may have actual market power in it, or those who

64

Id. T 405.

65
67

Id. T 171.
Id. 133.
Id.

68

Id. T 60.

66

69 The Commission's discounting of the advertising market seems to have been based in
large part on the fact that it is an attenuated measure of viewer preferences that does not
reflect the intensity of those preferences. Id.
70 Id. 142.
142, 179.
71 Id.
72 See Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 386-87 (3d Cir. 2004), certs.
denied, 125 S. Ct. 2902-04 (2005).
73 See FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 796 (1978); see also
2006 Notice, supra note 6, 32 ("[W]e recognize that some aspects of diversity may be
difficult to quantify."); 1998 NOI, supra note 48, at 1304-05 (separate statement of
Comm'r Michael Powell); 1998 Review, supra note 6, at 12,987-89 (separate statement of
Comm'r Michael Powell).
74 2002 Review, supra note 6, 178.
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have the potential ability to fill any programming needs that local broadcasters might ignore.
The Commission first raised the idea of a DVP market in a 1995 notice.75
It was based on the observation that, over a thirty-year period, a relatively
constant share of Americans' leisure time has been devoted to watching
television,76 even though "the price of subscribing to cable and DBS has
increased faster than the rate of inflation. 77 This phenomenon led the
Commission to conclude in its 2002 Review that there are no adequate
substitutes for video programming, and thus that the relevant product market is "no broader than" DVP. 78 The Commission's next step in the analysis was not entirely clear. Finding it unlikely that a television station duopoly "would affect the competitive strategy of a national cable network"
in light of the latter's national foCUS, 79 the Commission concluded that unilateral or coordinated actions by local stations "may result in potential
competitive harms."
This competition analysis raises a number of issues. As a threshold matter, it seems inconsistent with the Commission's recognition that duopolies
have in fact resulted in more and better programming in the larger markets
where they are permitted. 8' Another oddity about relying on an economic
market for watching television is that it seems to replicate the Comniission's diversity analysis, by assessing what kinds of programming choices
viewers may have. The Commission itself had previously raised concern
that these two concepts may not really differ, and elsewhere in the 2002
Review it seemed to conflate them, acknowledging not only the abundant
sources of viewpoint diversity but also "the myriad sources of competition"

In re Review of the Commission's Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting;
Television Satellite Stations Review of Policy and Rules, FurtherNotice of ProposedRulemaking, 10 F.C.C.R. 3524, app. C 24 (Dec. 15, 1994).
76 In 1970, 46.5% of Americans' leisure time was spent watching television; in 1998,
the figure was 15.3%. Id. 24. In the 2002 review, the Commission updated this data to
reflect a figure of 46.1% (as of 2000). 2002 Review, supra note 6, 142 n.284. See also In
re 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of the Commission's Broadcast Ownership
Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of
1996; Cross-Ownership of Broadcast Stations and Newspapers; Rules and Policies Concerning Multiple Ownership of Radio Broadcast Stations in Local Markets; Definition of
Radio Markets, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 18,503,
89-91 (Sept. 23,
2002) [hereinafter 2002 NPRM].
77 2002 Review, supra note 6,
142.
75

78
79

Id.

80

Id. 1 145; see also id. 191.
See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
2002 NPRM, supra note 76, 92.

81
82

Id. 191.
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to local television stations" 3 -including "competition from other sources of
DVP." 4
The notion of identifying an economic market, in which broadcasters
possess market power in offering a product for free, based on the fact that
viewers continue to watch television despite cable price hikes, is also
somewhat counterintuitive. The idea does not appear to have had any record support. Dr. Bruce Owen, upon whose statement the Commission
purportedly relied in its 2002 Review, 5 did not say that local television
stations compete in such a market.8 6 Indeed, he argued that the Commission should abandon entirely its effort to prescribe economic markets in
establishing broadcast ownership rules, asserting that it is an exercise that
unnecessarily duplicates the antitrust laws and ignores competing alternatives.8 7 In a world in which "consumers have demonstrated their willingness to adopt new media," Owen concluded that the Commission's economic markets analysis "makes no more sense... than for King Canute to
order away the ocean's waves. ''88
The term "delivered video programming" originated from completely
different concerns about the power of cable operators,8 9 in a market recog83

2002 Review, supra note 6, 1 133.

Id. 212. The absence of any "coherently defined market" suggests "motivations for
the broadcast ownership rules beyond purely economic objectives." Howard A. Shelanski,
Antitrust Law as Mass Media Regulation: Can Merger StandardsProtect the Public Interest?, 94 CAL. L. REv. 371, 389, 392 n.l11 (2006). See also Goodman, supra note 31, at
1395 n.1 1 ("[C]ompetition is desired for noneconomic reasons, [because] it duplicates the
diversity goal.").
85 See 2002 Review, supra note 6,
141.
86 The 2002 review cited this report's reference to "ordinary commercial markets for the
sale of advertising, the purchase of programming, and (in the case of multichannel video
program distributors, certain internet service providers, and print media), the compilation
of content packages and the provision of transmission services for sale to customers." See
id. at 13,671 n.280 (citing In re 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of the Commission's Broadcast Ownerships Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996; Cross-Ownership of Broadcast Stations and Newspapers; Rules and Policies Concerning Multiple Ownership of Radio Broadcast Stations in
Local Markets; Definition of Radio Markets; Definition of Radio Markets for Areas Not
Located in an Arbitron Survey Area, Comments of Fox Entm't Corp. Inc., Fox Television
Stations, Inc., Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc. and Telemundo Commc'ns Group, Inc., and Viacom
[hereinafter Fox/NBC/Viacom Comments], Statement of Bruce M. Owen, MB Docket Nos.
02-277, 01-235, 01-317, 00-244, at 1-2 (Jan. 2, 2003) [hereinafter Owen Statement]) (emphasis added). As this statement implicitly recognizes, local television stations do not compete in providing such compilations, and they do not charge for such programming.
87 Owen Statement, supranote 86, at 2.
88 Id. at 3. Cf Shelanski, supra note 84, at 402-19. Although Professor Shelanski identi84

fies limits on the ability of antitrust analysis to address efficiency issues in media mergers, a
number of those issues are common to problems with the Commission's analysis identified
above.
89 47 U.S.C. § 521 (2000) (findings of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992).
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nized to include only multichannel video programming distributors
("MVPDs"). In the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 ("1992 Cable Act"),9 Congress directed the Commission
to file annual reports on the status of competition "in the market for the
delivery of video programming."'" This market was never viewed (then or
now) as one that would include broadcast television stations. Indeed, for
purposes of cable rate regulation, the 1992 Cable Act repealed the Commission's prior definition of effective competition for cable operators,
which had been based on the number of local broadcast stations, in favor of
a definition that includes only DBS and other MVPDs as competitors.92
The Commission's video competition reports since that time have consistently reflected this same policy. While recognizing that broadcast stations
may have a potentially constraining effect on cable market power, the
Commission concluded that "there is no close substitute for that steadilyexpanding complement of specialized program services offered by the
typical cable system," 93 and that "broadcast television as a transmission
medium is insufficient to constrain cable market power." 94 The Commission's most recent video competition report continues to define the video
programming market as one for distribution of multichannel video programming. 95
Thus, the Commission's observation that the relevant economic market
may be "no broader" than all video programming begs four questions.
First, if the analysis turns on ability to raise prices, why is the relevant
market not the narrower one in which MVPDs charge for such programming, as Congress and the Commission have previously recognized? 96
Second, if cable operators have been able not only to increase their rates
but also to do so while surpassing the audience share enjoyed by local tele90 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
9' 47 U.S.C. § 548(g) (2000).
92 § 543(a)(1).
93 In re Implementation of Section 19 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992, Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market
for the Delivery of Video Programming, First Report, 9 F.C.C.R. 7442, 1 43 (Sept. 19,
1994).
94 In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery
of Video Programming, Second Annual Report, 11 F.C.C.R. 2060,1 115 (Dec. 7, 1995).
95 In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery
of Video Programming, Twelfth Annual Report, 21 F.C.C.R. 2503, 143 (Feb. 10, 2006)
[hereinafter Twelfth Video Competition Report].
96 The Commission noted that MVPDs' subscriber-based business model is "a competitive dynamic for which our competitive analysis should account." 2002 Review, supra note
6, 64. Strangely, however, it sought to account for this "competitive advantage" over
broadcasters by adding broadcasters into the same market and then finding that they may
have market power in that market, notwithstanding their competitive disadvantage. Id. IN
61-62.
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vision stations,97 why did the Commission conclude that its competitive
concern should be with local television stations, which are made subject to
the duopoly rule, rather than with local cable operators, which are not?
Third, why would the Commission focus its competition analysis on the
indifference of national cable networks to program choices made by local
television stations, when in its diversity analysis the Commission recognized, consistent with its prior views, that cable operators can provide local viewers with alternative programs and viewpoints? And what about the
ability of other television stations in the market to do so? Fourth, as noted
above, how can there be concerns about the lack of competitive constraints
on television stations' delivery of video programming if duopolies have in
fact led to more and better programming?
By ignoring cable operators in this competition analysis of the DVP
market, the Commission also failed in the 2002 Review fully to address the
concerns of the D.C. Circuit in Sinclair.98 In that case, the D.C. Circuit
declined to consider whether the requirement of eight independent voices
in a local television market was "plucked out of thin air," 99 warning that it
would "leave [that consideration] for another day. ' ° What it found fatal
was the fact that the Commission had counted voices differently for the
cross-ownership rule than it did for the duopoly rule.'O Although the
Commission had determined that the inclusion of radio, cable, and newspaper outlets for purposes of the former rule "more accurately reflects the
actual level of diversity and competition in the market,"'' 0 2 it excluded these
outlets for purposes of the duopoly rule. 10 3 In its 2002 Review, the Commission only partially addressed this inconsistency. As noted above, it concluded that media outlets other than television stations "contribute to viewpoint diversity in local markets.""1° But the Commission confined Sin97 The 1988 data relied upon by the Commission indicated that local television stations
enjoyed over four times the viewing of cable networks. By the 2004-05 television season,
the combined audience share of all nonbroadcast networks had exceeded that of local television stations by a substantial margin (59% vs. 41%). Twelfth Video Competition Report,
supra note 95, 165. To be sure, a local station's share will generally exceed that of any
one cable network, many of which serve very niche audiences. But the issue here is whether
a cable operatorcan adjust its programming selections to meet any viewer needs unfulfilled
by local broadcast stations. Id.
98 Sinclair Broad. Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
99 Id. at 162. The Commission had earlier suggested that six, not eight, should be adequate for this purpose. Id. at 153. In the 2002 review, it abandoned this voice test entirely
(for duopolies). As noted below, the Third Circuit remanded that issue, although its analysis
appears to have centered on concerns about the voice test for triopolies. Prometheus Radio
Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 418-20 (3d Cir. 2004); 2006 Notice, supra note 6, U 13, 16,
18 (seeking comment on validity of outlet rather than audience share test).
1oo Sinclair,284 F.3d at 162.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 164 (quoting 1998 Review, supra note 6, 1 107) (emphasis added).
103
104

Id.

2002 Review, supra note 6, 1 133.
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clair'srelevance to its diversity analysis.'05 This reading of Sinclair, which
had found the role of other outlets inconsistently addressed in both°6 the
Commission's "diversity and competition" analyses, was incomplete.'
In short, the competitive concerns that led the Commission to permit
only very limited duopoly relief in smaller markets reflected a market
analysis that raises a number of questions. For example, what constitutes
the market for 'watching television'? Who are the sellers in that market,
and how able are they to respond to program choices made by local television stations? Have the programming choices made by duopolies provided
any evidence of power in this putative market? The Commission's market
analysis also attempted to finesse the Sinclaircourt's concern about ignoring local cable outlets for competition as well as diversity purposes. Since
the 2002 Review's basis for continuing duopoly restrictions turned primarily on the Commission's conclusions about this DVP market, the 2006
Review should include a careful look at these questions.
C. Competition in the Video Advertising Market
Another traditional focal point of the Commission's multiple ownership
analyses has been the competitive effect of consolidation on advertisers. In
its 2002 Review, the Commission found that the then existing duopoly rule
was "not necessary to promote competition in the video advertising market"; its primary concern involved competition in the DVP market described above.° 7 The Commission was concerned with the impact of duopolies on the advertising market only secondarily, to the extent that competition in this market "adds an extra level of protection."'' 0 8 It is thus unclear how much the Commission intended to rely on its competition analysis of this market, but because that analysis reflects the kinds of internal
inconsistencies that the courts have found troubling in the past, the approach warrants rethinking in the 2006 Review.
On the one hand, the Commission was not persuaded by economic studies demonstrating that advertisers rely on cable and other outlets including
broadcast television stations. Instead, the Commission viewed television
stations as able to price discriminate against those advertisers who do not
'0'Id. 171.
106

Sinclair,284 F.3d at 164. In its earlier review, the Commission had deemed its eight

station test to be "necessary for two reasons." First, it was concerned about the unique role
of television for diversity purposes. Second, it was "unable to reach a definitive conclusion"
about substitutes for television stations "in the advertising and delivered video programming markets." Thus, the restriction was imposed to ensure "that markets remain sufficiently diverse and competitive." 1998 Review, supra note 6, 1 68-70 (emphasis added).
See also 2002 BiennialReview, supra note 76, 176.
1072002 Review, supra note 6, 1 141, 151.
108 Id. 151.
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view these other outlets as adequate substitutes.' °9 This view was not based
on contrary economic studies; in fact, the Commission's own study "d[id]
not attempt to address whether cable television ... compete[s] with local
television .. .for local advertising dollars."'"l ° A survey of actual inter-

views with "media buyers and agency representatives" showed that they
"almost unanimously discounted the possibility" of such price discrimination."' The Commission, however, took the position that only broadcasters, and not their local cable competitors, have a keen understanding of
advertisers, based on their repeated interaction."'
The Commission had previously indicated an inclination to include cable
in the same advertising market,' 3 and elsewhere in the 2002 Review the
Commission acknowledged a study suggesting that it is cable that "may
have market power over some local advertisers." '" 14 It also cited with approval two other studies demonstrating that joint operation of stations
through LMAs is "unlikely to result in any competitive harm to local advertisers.""' 5 The Commission must address this issue with more consistency in the 2006 Review.
The Commission will also presumably address cable's growing share in
of the viewing audience" 16 as well as its growing ability to compete more
effectively in the advertising market by clustering. 1"' Even in 2002, the
Commission's staff study recognized that cable advertising had been
"growing much faster" than broadcast advertising." 8 Moreover, the Commission's most recent video competition report notes that cable operators'
local advertising revenues have increased by 12% in each of the last two
years." 9 And local online advertising is predicted to grow by 31% in 2007,
'09Id.

152, nn. 298-99.

110
C. Anthony Bush, FCC Media Ownership Working Group, The Substitutability of
Local Newspaper, Radio, and Television Advertising in Local Business Sales 4 (2002). The
Commission did cite the statement of Hearst-Argyle that television stations have advantages
over "niche boutique cable network offerings." 2002 Review, supra note 6, at n.296 (citing
Bear Steams Comments). Here, again, however, the relevant comparison is to local cable
operators, not cable networks.
"1' Comments of Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc. ex. 8, at 30 (Jan. 2, 2003), cited in 2002
Review, supra note 6, at nn.298-99.
112 2002 Review, supra note 6, at 13,676 n.299.
"3 2002 Biennial Review, supra note 76,
87.
1142002 Review, supra note 6, at 13,676 n.297.
"' Id.jj 153.
"6

See Twelfth Video CompetitionReport, supra note 95,

165.

117 1998 Review, supra note 6, 1 37.

118 Jonathan Levy, et al., Broadcast Television: Survivor in a Sea of Competition 12

(FCC Office of Plans and Policy, Working Paper No. 37, 2002) [hereinafter OPPStudy].
119Twelfth Video Competition Report, supra note 95, at tbl.4. This trend has continued,
and is expected to continue at least through 2009. See NCTA, Cable Advertising Revenue:
1985-2006, available at http://ncta.com/ContentView.aspx?contentld=70; Comments of
NBC Universal, Inc. and NBC Telemundo License Co., MB Docket No. 06-121, at 8-9
(Oct. 23, 2006).
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to $7.7 billion. 2 ° In light of these trends, it is certainly worth examining
whether there remain significant numbers' 21of advertisers "that do not have
good substitutes for broadcast television."'
D. Intermedia Substitutability
As noted above, the Commission found in its 2002 Review of the duopoly rule that "media outlets other than television stations contribute significantly to viewpoint diversity in local markets," and that competitive
forces would ensure program diversity. 22 The principal fear of many opponents of greater duopoly relief in smaller markets is that there are generally fewer television stations in these markets and that, notwithstanding the
proliferation of other media voices, the public still depends upon local
television stations as its primary sources of local news and information.' 23
The D.C. Circuit rejected the basis for this factual assumption in the 1998
Review as undocumented. 24 In fact, ascertaining the extent of reliance
upon local television stations for news and informational
programming has
125
proven extraordinarily difficult for the Commission.
More than twenty years ago, the Commission concluded that it should
include radio, cable, other video media, and print media in assessing "the
information market relevant to diversity." ' 26 Given the far greater number
of information sources available to the public today and their use as complements rather than substitutes, 27 it is unclear why reaching a conclusion
120

See Borell Associates, Outlook for 2007: Pac-Man Pace for Local Online Ads (Ex-

ecutive
Summary,
Sept.
2006),
at
2,
available
at
http://www.borrellassociates.com/report.cfm (free registration required for download).
121 2002 Review, supra note 6, 152.
122 Id.
176-82.
123 Id. N 173-75. Of course, this fear also assumes that duopolies will reduce the diversity of viewpoints expressed (or potentially expressible) by local stations. This is a much
debated point. Id.
124 Sinclair Broad. Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 163-64 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The
1997 Roper poll relied upon by the Commission for this proposition did suggest that (back
then) viewers preferred broadcast over cable programming. But the court noted that the
Roper poll said nothing about viewers' preferred sources of news. Id.
125 See 1998 Review, supra note 6, 33 (noting the "unresolved questions" about "intermedia substitutability"); see also Shelanski, supra note 84, at 393 nn.113-14, 403-4
nn. 142-46.
126 In re Amendment of Section 73.3555 [formerly Sections 73.35, 73.240, and 73.636]
of the Commission's Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television
Broadcast Stations, Report and Order, 100 F.C.C.2d 17,
25 (July 26, 1984); In re
Amendment of Section 73.3555 [formerly Sections 73.35, 73.240, and 73.636] of the
Commission's Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broadcast
Stations, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 100 F.C.C.2d 74 (Dec. 19, 1984) [hereinafter
Amendment of Section 73.3555].
127 According to a recent Pew survey, "[h]alf of the public uses multiple news sources on
a typical day." PEW RESEARCH CTR. BIENNIAL NEWS CONSUMPION SURVEY; ONLINE
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as to their relative usage rates is necessary for purposes of the duopoly
rule. 12 8 Relative usage rates may have some bearing on how to set the
number of radio versus newspaper outlets in a market that can be co-owned
with a television station for purposes of the cross-ownership rule. In fact, it
is within that context that the Commission developed the Diversity Index
reflecting its judgment about substitutability. 129 In contrast, the Commission's diversity analysis for the duopoly rule in its 2002 Review continued
to rely on the fact that "countless other sources of news and information"
are "available," regardless of whether, or to what extent, they are actually
used. 3 0
Even in calculating the Diversity Index for purposes of the crossownership rule, the Commission was neither definitive nor internally consistent on this point. It adopted a usage measure as one of its "conservative
assumptions" about viewpoint diversity. 13' It then weighted various different media by usage data derived from one of the studies it commissioned. 132 Yet the Commission declined to weight outlets within the same
medium (e.g., all local television stations) on a usage basis because "current behavior is not necessarily an accurate predictor of future behavior,"
and "media outlets can change the amount of news and current affairs that
they offer" in response to competitive conditions "at very low marginal
coSt.' ' 133 In this context, the Commission relied not on the content citizens
actually access, but on what viewpoints "have an opportunity to reach"
them. 134 Then, in the case of the Internet, the Commission reverted
to a
35
usage test to differentiate telephone and cable modem subscribers.1
Not surprisingly, these inconsistencies proved fatal for the Diversity Index in the Third Circuit's review. Rejecting the idea that a community college television station could "mak[e] a greater contribution to viewpoint
diversity than a conglomerate that includes the third-largest newspaper in
PAPERS MODESTLY BOOST NEWSPAPER READERSHIP 11 (2006), available at http://people-

press.org/reports/pdf/282.pdf [hereinafter 2006 Pew Survey].
128 Amendment of Section 73.3555, supra note 126,
20 ("The fact that the various media may not be perfect substitutes for one another does not negate their status as competing,
antagonistic sources of information for the purposes of diversity analysis").
129 2002 Review, supra note 6,
130 Id. 178 (emphasis added).
131

409.

Id. T 399. Another of these assumptions was to disregard cable news channels and

news sources over the Internet that are national in scope. The Commission has recognized,
however, that such information can be no less critical to an informed citizenry than purely
local information. See Broadcast Localism NOI, supra note 48,

14 (citing In re Revision

of Programming and Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment Requirements, and Program Log Requirements for Commercial Television Stations, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 358,

15 (May 1, 1986).

Nielsen Media Research, FCC Media Ownership Working Group: Consumer Survey
on Media Usage, 8 tbl.8 (2002) [hereinafter MOWG Study 8].
133 2002 Review, supra note 6, 423.
'34 Id. [425.
131 Id. [426.
132
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America," '36 the court seemed to call for a usage test rather than an availability test. But as those who would apply market analysis to the marketplace of ideas have recognized, market share is a concept ill-suited to
measuring viewpoints. 37 As long as viewpoints are not suppressed, there
would seem to be no failure in the marketplace of ideas-unless one subscribes to the notion that the FCC should strive to ensure some sort of ideological parity, under which "all ideas should be equally popular."'' 38 That
notion would seem at odds with established doctrine that "the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market ....
Indeed, a duopoly rule that reflects "concer[n] with the communicative
impact" of one speaker as compared to another would seem to raise substantial First Amendment concerns if it is based on the speaker's content. 40
It may not be fatal to limit the outlets one firm may own in a market without reference to content, "in order to enhance the relative voice of others," 14' at least under the current First Amendment model for broadcast
regulation.142 But "pick[ing] winners and losers in the marketplace to serve

136

Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372,408 (2004), certs. denied, 125 S. Ct.

2902-04 (2005).
137 Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Antitrust and the Marketplace of Ideas, 69
ANTITRUST L.J. 249, 275-78 (2001).
138 Owen Statement, supra note 86, at 8-9.
139 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes & Brandeis, JJ., dissenting). See also Shelanski, supra note 84, at 386-87 nn.81-82. For an interesting perspective
on the difficulties of the less circulated thought to "get itself accepted" in today's Information Age, see Philip J. Weiser, The Ghost of Telecommunications Past, 103 MICH. L. REV.
1671, 1692-93 (2005) (describing network effects of more popular programs on public
discourse).
140 Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 658 (1994). Concerns about "Big
Media," or the "drumbeat of one-sided talk shows," or "pumped-in, homogenized, syndicated programming," also seem to border on such qualitative judgments. 2002 Review,
supra note 6, at 13,957, 13,959 (Copps, Comm'r, dissenting), 13988 (Adelstein, Comm'r,
dissenting).
141 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976). See also First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 790-91 n.31 (1978) ("[Tlhe fact that advocacy may persuade the electorate is
hardly a reason to suppress it"). Accord, Amendment of Section 73.3555, supra note 126, at
20 ("The fact that the government may fear the persuasive power of this organ of the press
does not mean that the First Amendment allows it to act on those fears.").
142 See FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 799-800 (1978). The
analysis holds for cable as well. See Time Warner Entm't Co. L.P. v. United States, 211
F.3d 1313, 1323 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (rejecting facial challenge to cable horizontal cap and
channel occupancy limits); U.S. WEST, Inc. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1092, 1100 (9th Cir.
1994), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 516 U.S. 1155 (1996) (refusing to apply
strict scrutiny in striking down former statutory ban on telephone company provision of
cable service).
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some hazy notions of diversity" is an exercise the Commission should
think carefully about embarking upon in the context of the duopoly rule.'4 3
Nevertheless, in light of the Third Circuit's decision, factual questions
about the availability and use of other local news and information outlets
will be a key part of the 2006 Review. As noted above, such questions
have proven difficult to resolve in the past. Last time around, the FCC
commissioned a study that purported to address such questions more specifically than the 1997 Roper poll criticized in Sinclair. The Commission
ultimately found the results of that study, too, to be unreliable.' 44 The study
reported that of those who got their local news from television, 67%
watched it on "broadcast television channels" and 58% watched it on "cable or satellite news channels.' ' 45 However, the Commission refused to
credit this data, because it found that cable subscriber respondents may
have misunderstood the source of local broadcast news programs received
over cable, and because the data did not line up with the low audience ratings for local cable channels." 4 Accordingly, because of the absence of
accurate data, and in order "to simplify [its] general analysis," the Commission excluded cable from that analysis. 47 It undertook to review the
matter more carefully
in its next review, 148 and the Third Circuit upheld
49
this decision.
The Commission has taken these data limitations to heart and will undertake additional surveys in the course of its 2006 Review in order to refine
the information and update it in light of market developments. One key
question is how meaningful the importance of television news really is for
these purposes. The most recent biennial Pew survey of news consumption,
released in July 2006, confirms that television remains the most popular
source of news, and that regular use of local television news (54%) is still
about the same as it was six years ago (56%).150 However, local content
does not appear to be as important a reason for watching television as it is
for reading the newspaper.' 51 Moreover, those who follow local government news cited newspapers (53%) over television (45%) as their pre143 See In re Evaluation of the Syndication and Financial Interest Rules, Report
and
Order, 6 F.C.C.R. 3094, 3242 (Apr. 9, 1991) (Quello, Comm'r, dissenting), vacated sub
nom., Schurz Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043 (7th Cir. 1992). See also Shelanski, supra note 84, at 411 n.172.
'44 See 2002 Review, supra note 6,
413 (suggesting data from the study to be unreliable).
145 MOWG Study 8, supra note 132, at tbl.8. Cf 2002 Review, supra note 6,
413 (using
the figure of 46.4%, rather than 58%, for cable).
146 2002 Review, supra note 6, 414.
141 Id. T 408.
148
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Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 404-08 (3rd Cir. 2004), certs denied, 125 S. Ct. 2904 (2005).
150 2006 Pew Survey, supra note 127, at 11-12, 56-59,
62.
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dominant source for local content.' That preference was even stronger for
those who follow news about people and events in their community (61%
for newspapers versus 34% for television).' 53 According to the Pew survey,
the public appears to rely on television much more for national and international news as well as weather, sports, and breaking news."
Another important issue for the 2006 Review will be how many cable
subscribers now have access to local cable news channels. As of 2002, the
figure was only about one-third. 155 Even then, however, the Commission
noted that local news programming available on cable channels had been
increasing, and that "cable ... is becoming a more important source of
local news and information."' 5 6 The FCC staff study relied upon by the
Third Circuit confirmed this point, noting that cable news was "increasingly moving into smaller markets" in light of "the lower cost of digital
production," and that "many predict that regional news programs could
become a significant competitive force in the video programming marketplace." 5 7 According to the Commission's most recent annual report, there
are now forty-five regional cable news networks.' 5 8
The Commission also included the Internet as an informational source
for purposes of its Diversity Index, albeit a minor one, noting the "virtual
universe of information sources on the Internet."' 59 Here again, its position
did not survive judicial review because the court found it inconsistent with
the Commission's own statements-about counting only media outlets that
provide local news, and only those that perform an "aggregator" and a
"distillation" function. 6 ° This time, the Commission will need to provide a
better explanation if it wants to include the Internet in its analysis.' 6'
In doing so, it should ask whether its prior analysis of the Internet may
have been too narrow. Even as of two years ago, a Harris poll indicated
that 36% of those adults who go online do so to obtain local news. 62 But in
152 Id. at
153Id.

28.

4 Id. at 27-28.
1552002 Review, supra note 6,

414 n.924. The Third Circuit relied heavily on this same
data, but using a 30% figure. Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 415 (3rd Cir.
2004), certs. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2902-04 (2005).
156 2002 Review, supra note 6, 1 413.
157OPP Study, supra note 118, at 125-26.
158 Twelfth Video Competition Report, supra note 95, 1 185 tbl. C-3.
1592002 Review, supra note 6, 1 427.
160 Prometheus, 373 F.3d at 406-07. See also Twelfth Video Competition Report, supra
note 95, 138.
161 Prometheus, 373 F.3d at 408. See also 2006 Pew Survey, supra note 127, at 15. In
light of the Third Circuit's criticism, the Commission may find relevant this recent survey
indicating that Internet "news aggregators such as Google News, Yahoo News, and AOL
News are now a major source of online news." Id.
162 HarrisInteractive,
The Harris Poll #35 (May 19, 2004), available at
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris-polllindex.asp?PID=464.
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any event, as the Supreme Court has recognized, Internet content is "as
diverse as human thought."' 163 In his Third Circuit dissent, Chief Judge
Scirica suggested that the Commission rethink "the emphasis on local
news," which ignores the value of the Internet as "an important source for
the dissemination of diverse information."'" The Commission itself has
recognized-even before the advent of the ubiquitous Internet-that "programming that addresses local concerns need not be produced or originated
locally to qualify as 'issue-responsive' in connection with a [broadcast]
licensee's program service obligations.' 65
Whatever the problems associated with measuring use rather than availability, or with treating complementary products as substitutes, the Commission obviously should update the record in light of the public's increasing reliance on Internet content. The Commission's prior study indicated
that the Internet led all other outlets as the news source that survey respondents would be more likely to use in the future. 66 Recent data also reveal
that the percentage of Americans who regularly get news online has now
increased from 23% to 31% between 2000 and 2006, with even stronger
growth among those aged twenty-five to sixty-four.167 Indeed, as of December 2005, another Pew survey reported that 50 million Americans turn
to the Internet for news on a typical day. 168 This sea change in access to
and use of the variety of news and information provided by the Internet
cannot be ignored in the 2006 Review.
E. The Top Four Restriction
In the 2002 Review, the Commission concluded that competition concerns, principally in the DVP market, required some restraint on duopolies.
Accordingly, it continued to bar duopolies between any two top four-rated
stations in a market as "necessary to promote competition."' 169 As noted
above, that competition analysis is questionable and appears inconsistent
with Sinclairfor ignoring other media as competitive outlets. There is also
reason to question whether such a top four restriction is (or remains) a justifiable response to such concerns even if they continued to be legitimate,
particularly in light of the sweeping effects of such a restriction. The restriction precludes a wide range of duopolies, including any relief in any of
163

Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 852 n.7 (1997) (citing ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp.

824, 842 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
164 Prometheus,373 F.3d at 469 (Scirica, C.J., dissenting).
165 BroadcastLocalism NOI, supra note 48, 14.
166 MOWG Study 8, supra note 132, at 72 (tbl.70), 73 (tbl.71), 74 (tbl.72), 75 (tbl.73), 76
(tbl.74).
167 2006 Pew Survey, supra note 127, at 2-3.
168 Pew Internet & American Life Project, Online News, Mar. 22, 2006,

http://207.21.232.103/pdfs/PIPNews.and.Broadband.pdf.
169 2002 Review, supra note 6, 220. See also id. 212.
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at least eighty markets with less than five commercial stations. 70 As still
unresolved petitions for reconsideration of the 2002 Review have pointed
out, the top four restriction was thus difficult to square with the Commission's repeated acknowledgements that it is in such smaller markets that
broadcasters have the most pressing need for duopoly relief, 71 and in
the greatest likelihood
which Commissioner Adelstein recognized there 1is
72
relief.
such
warranting
gains"
localism
of "proven
The Third Circuit upheld this "line-drawing" exercise as "not unreasonable."'73 That holding certainly does not preclude the Commission from
reexamining the issue in light of current market conditions, as required by
section 202(h). Such a reexamination makes sense, because the 2002 Review's analysis proceeded largely from a perspective of how profitable the
top four stations are in the largest markets. Given the recognized difficulties of stations in the smaller markets, the 2006 Review should take greater
care to differentiate among markets of different sizes. In doing so, it should
focus on four issues raised in the 2002 Review.
First, as the Third Circuit recognized, the top four restriction was prem174
ised upon "welfare harms" in creating a new largest firm in the market.
A top four restriction appears to be an overbroad way of addressing that
concern. 75 As such, it prevents the leading station from acquiring a much
weaker-performing fourth-ranked station. It also prevents weaker third and
fourth-ranked stations from merging to compete with a dominant firstranked station. In fact, in the vast majority of markets below the top sevand fourth ranked staenty-five, combining the market shares of the third
76
tions would not displace the top ranked station.

170

See REED BUSINESS INFORMATION, BROADCASTING & CABLE YEARBOOK B 132-215

(2006). See also In re 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of the Commission's
Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Petitionfor Reconsideration of LIN Television Corporation
and Raycom Media, Inc., at 8-9 att.A (Sept. 4, 2003) (accessible via FCC Electronic Comment Filing System) [hereinafter LIN/Raycom Petition]. In 2002, the average number of
stations was no more than four in all 110 markets below the top 100. In re 2002 Biennial
Regulatory Review-Review of the Commission's Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other
Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Ex Parte
Communicationof Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters,chart 3 (Apr. 30, 2003).
171 See, e.g., LIN/Raycom Petition, supra note 170, at 3-13. The Commission recently
invited parties to update the record on pending petitions for reconsideration. 2006 Notice,
supra note 6, 36.
172 2002 Review, supra note 6, at 13,998.
173 Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 417 (3rd Cir. 2004), certs. denied,
125 S.Ct. 2902-4 (2005).
174 Id. at 416.
'75 See id. at 416; 2002 Review, supra note 6,
195.
176 Prometheus, 373 F.3d at 417 n.49 (citing Ex Parte Filing of Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters, MB Docket No. 02-277 (May 22, 2003) (accessible via FCC Electronic CoOmment
Filing System).
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Second, the top four restriction assumed that such mergers would not be
capable of bringing local news programming to the market, because "top
four-ranked stations already provide local news programming."' 177 That was
not true in small markets then, and, given current financial trends, it is even
less likely to be true today. The data relied upon by the Commission in
2002 showed that 111 top four-ranked stations did not offer local news. 178
The vast majority of those stations were in smaller markets. 179 And the
(107 out of
record actually indicated that more than half of all markets
80
newscasts.
local
independent
four
than
fewer
had
210)
Third, the Commission's conclusion that top four-ranked stations are all
significantly more profitable than others was perplexing. It was based on
data supplied by National Association of Broadcasters ("NAB") that demonstrated that this was true only by averaging all four network affiliates,
and only in the top 50 markets.1"' Such data ignored what NAB noted was
"a significant decline in financial performance" for top four affiliates "in
medium and small markets which were not ratings leaders in their markets."' 182 NAB's study demonstrated that the average low-rated affiliate of
one of the top four networks actually showed negative profitability in 2001
in markets 51-175, and that even the average high-rated affiliate of one of
these top four networks experienced flat or declining profitability in markets 51-100 and 126-150.183 Oddly, the Commission itself used this same
NAB data to conclude that ability "to compete successfully" is "meaningfully (and negatively) affected in mid-sized and smaller markets."'"
Fourth, the Commission saw a bright line distinction between the audience shares of the fourth and fifth-ranked networks, which it found to be
reflected generally in local market rankings of their affiliated stations. National network data, however, is heavily skewed by the top twenty-five

177
178

2002 Review, supra note 6, 198. See also 1998 Review, supra note 6, 66.
2002 Review, supra note 6, 198 (finding 668 of 779 top four stations offered local

news). See also LIN/Raycom Petition,supra note 170, at 9-10.
179See FoxINBC/Viacom Comments, supra note 86, at Economic Study A table Al.
180Id. at 3-4. Although 18 of the smaller DMAs included in this figure had fewer than
four rated stations, in 13 of those 18 markets a rated station did not carry local news. Id. at
4. See also Ex parte filing of Gray Television, Inc. att. A (May 29, 2003) (120 out of 210
markets).
1812002 Review, supra note 6, at 13,697 n.417 (citing Ex parte filing of NAB, April 30,
2003, at 2, Chart 1).
182 Ex parte Letter of Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters,MB Docket No. 02-277, at 1 (April
30, 2003) (accessible via FCC Electronic Comment Filing System).
183 In re 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of the Commission's Broadcast
Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Comments of the Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters,MB Docket No. 02-277,

MM Docket No. 01-235, MM Docket No. 01-317, MM Docket No. 00-244, at 74 and att.C
(Jan. 2, 2003). See also LIN/Raycom Petition, supra note 170, at 10-11.

1842002 Review, supra note 6,
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markets. 185 In addition, drawing this line between the fourth- and fifthranked stations ignored the problems of the third- and fourth-ranked stations (particularly but not only in four-station markets). The record showed
that the fourth-ranked station, for example, trailed the third-ranked station
by 34% in audience share and 26% in revenue share. 186 Any such linedrawing in the 2006 Review should examine the separation between second-, third-, and fourth-ranked stations as well, using updated information.
Under the mandate of section 202(h), the top four restriction clearly warrants reexamination in the 2006 Review. To the extent any restriction on
small market duopolies continues to be warranted, one alternative that
ought to be to considered is an audience share cap, which was intended to
serve as a "backstop" when the Commission first allowed radio duopolies 87 and was proposed as such an alternative by small market television
owners in the 2002 Review. 88 An important aspect of any such standard
would be whether-in light of the growing audience and advertising shares
of MVPDs-it should include nonbroadcast viewing. Another alternative
would be a tiered system reflective of the significant financial difficulties
faced by smaller market stations-e.g., a top four test in larger markets, a
top three test in middle markets, and a top two test in the smallest markets. 8 9 While the top four standard withstood judicial scrutiny as "not unreasonable" the last time around, the Commission is obligated to take a
harder look at that question in light of the foregoing concerns, and the current state of broadcast television in smaller markets.

HI. CONCLUSION
In its approach to the 2006 Review of the television duopoly rule, this
Commission will undoubtedly look back with envy at its predecessors.
Justice Frankfurter vested the agency with sweeping "public interest" authority in light of "the complicated factors for judgment in such a field,"
and intended that authority to serve as "a supple instrument for the exercise
of discretion by the expert body which Congress has charged to carry out

185 Id.
186

Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 417 n.50 (2004), certs. denied, 125

S. Ct. 2902-04 (2005).
187 See 2002 Review, supra note 6, %301. See also In re Revision of Radio Rules and
Policies, Report and Order,7 F.C.C.R. 2755, 40 (Mar. 12, 1992).
188 See Ex parte Letter of LIN Television Corp., Raycom Media, Inc., Waterman Broadcasting Corp., and Montclair Comm., Inc., MB Docket No. 02-277 (May 15, 2003) (acces-

sible via FCC Electronic Comment Filing system) (endorsing 30% test).

189 Prometheus, 373 F.3d at 417 n.49 (citing Ex Parte Filing of Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters, MB Docket No. 02-277 (May 22, 2003) (accessible via FCC Electronic CoOmment
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its legislative policy."'" Fifty years ago, a very different D.C. Circuit also
authorized the Commission "to consider diversification of control.., and
to attach such significance to it as its judgment dictates.""19 As recent appellate decisions in this area make clear, these governing precepts are no
longer in vogue. The First Amendment standards applicable to corporate
speech are much more searching, the communications sector has become
much more important to the national economy and thus to Congress, and
the "well-known principles of deference accorded to agency decision' seem to be viewed with greater skepticism.
making"192
To surmount these obstacles after two failed attempts will be a challenge.
The one consistent theme from the courts has been the inconsistency of the
Commission's analysis, both internally and as compared to its prior decisions. Some of these inconsistencies reflect policy differences among different Commissions, which are certainly acceptable if explained forthrightly and consistent with the 1996 Act.'9 3 Others seem to be a feature of a
decision-making process that tries to accomplish too much at one sitting,
requiring compromises that end up as vulnerabilities on judicial review.
Still other inconsistencies, like the ill-fated Diversity Index and the DVP
market analysis, seem based on understandable but ultimately problematic
efforts to quantify the unquantifiable nature of viewpoint diversity, or to
avoid addressing its "elusive" nature.
The prospect of a Commission confined to a cycle of never-ending section 202(h) reviews and subsequent court challenges is a serious problem
for those smaller market television owners whose difficulties the Commission has long acknowledged, yet whose fate seems tied to the larger de94
bates about "Big Media." For them, a fourth try would not be a charm,'
because their competitive environment is changing too quickly. They need
the finality and reliability of a resolution that will hold up under judicial
scrutiny.
The Commission can maximize the chances for resolving this issue successfully in its upcoming review by reference to a few key guideposts, in
addition to updating its prior record, an important statutory requirement in
light of the rapid pace of change in this industry. The Commission should
engage in a more rigorous analysis of the extent to which, in today's multimedia environment, local television stations can realistically be viewed as
190 FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940). Accord Nat'l Broad. Co. v.
United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943); FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582,
593 (1981).
191 McClatchy Broad. Co. v. FCC, 239 F.2d 15, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
192 Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 435 (3d Cir. 2004) (Scirica, C.J.,
dissenting in part, concurring in part), certs. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2902--04 (2005).
193 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59
(1983) (Rehnquist, J., Burger, C.J., Powell, J., & O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
194 Cf. Covad Commc'ns Co. v. FCC, 450 F.3d 528, 531 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
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holding any market power over viewers or advertisers. It should avoid the
same form of "managed competition" in the marketplace of ideas that it
finally was forced to discard in the market for local competition in the telecommunications sector, after almost a decade of litigation. 9 5 And the
Commission should commit to a much more granular analysis regarding
the effect of any proposed duopoly rule on television stations operating in
the difficult financial environment of smaller markets, without untested
assumptions about the value of network affiliations in those markets.
Finally, the Commission should demonstrate that it has taken a truly hard
look at the salient problems 96 that have served to animate so many of the
opponents of the 2002 Review. The Commission may well conclude that
there is "an alternative regulatory scheme or set of rules" apart from ownership limits to "better address" those problems, such as localism concerns.' 97 It may also be able to ultimately reach closure on the issue of minority ownership, using constitutionally sustainable
tools that do not de198
tract from any needed reforms of the duopoly rule.
The Commission may also conclude that the public interest standard may
warrant a wholly different approach to viewpoint diversity concerns. Some
have argued that there is "a large difference between the public interest and
what interests the public."' 99 There are obvious First Amendment perils in
prescribing medicine for an unwilling viewing public that now possesses
195 See J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulationand Managed Competition
in Network Industries, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 117 (1998); Michael K. Powell, Comm'r, Fed.
Commc'ns Comm'n, Technology and Regulatory Thinking: Albert Einstein's Warning,
Address Before the Legg Mason Investor Workshop (Mar. 13, 1998) (transcript available at
http://www.fcc.gov/Speechies/Powell/spmkp804.html).
See generally JONATHAN E.
NUECHTERLEIN
&
PHILIP
J.
WEISER,
DIGITAL
CROSSROADS:
AMERICAN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE 92-108 (2005).

196 Fla. Cellular Mobil Commc'ns Corp. v. FCC, 28 F.3d 191, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 514 U.S. 1016 (1995) (quoting Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d
841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971)).
1972006 Notice, supra note 6, 4.
198 The Third Circuit directed that the Commission's "rulemaking process" on remand
"address these proposals at the same time." Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d
372, 390-95 (3d Cir. 2004), certs. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2902-04 (2005). The 2006 Notice has
solicited further comment on them. While the court's instruction was not clear as to whether
or how regulatory reform should be tied to action on these proposals, that mandate should
be read in light of the Supreme Court's observation that agencies "should be free to fashion
their own rules of procedure and to pursue methods of inquiry capable of permitting them to
discharge their multitudinous duties." FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 143
(1940); accord. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 543-44 (1978).
See also 47 U.S.C. § 1540) (2000); GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 782 F.2d 263, 273-74 n.12
(D.C. Cir. 1986) ("inherent powers of an agency to control its own docket").
199Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest, 88 CAL. L. REv. 499, 501
(2000). But see In re Deregulation of Radio, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 87 F.C.C.2d
797,
19 (July 30, 1981) ("In our view, it is completely reasonable to conclude that individuals will make choices and will seek out and listen to that programming that corresponds
with their needs.").
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the tools to avoid taking its prescription. As one commentator has urged,
however, if attention deficit disorder rather than viewpoint diversity is now
the problem we face in the Information Age, there may be more constructive ways for the Commission to address it, or to suggest that Congress do
so, than by restricting ownership. E"0 As always, whether in regulating or in
deregulating, the Commission should consider any such alternatives seriously advanced for its consideration, and provide defensible reasons if it
determines to reject them.2"' Getting this question right is vital20 2if broadcast
television is to remain as a "survivor in a sea of competition.
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